The existing economics and IS literature on technology adoption often considers network externalities as one of the main factors that affect adoption decisions. It assumes that potential adopters achieve a certain level of expectations about network externalities when they have to decide whether to adopt a particular technology. However, there has been little discussion on how the potential adopters reach their expectations. This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature on adoption of information technology (IT), by offering an optimal control perspective motivated by the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) and exploring the process dynamics associated with the actions of decision makers who must adjust their expectations about the benefits of a new technology over time due to bounded rationality. Our model primarily addresses technologies that exhibit strong network externalities. It stresses adaptive learning to show why different firms that initially have heterogeneous expectations about the potential value of a technology eventually are able to arrive at contemporaneous decisions to adopt the same technology, creating the desired network externalities. This further allows the firms to become catalysts to facilitate processes that lead to market-wide adoption. We also discuss the conditions under which adoption inertia will take over in the marketplace, and the related managerial implications.
INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature on adoption of information technology (IT) [Choi and Thum, 1998; Jensen, 1982; Shapiro, 1985 and 1986 ; Kauffman, McAndrews and Wang, 2000] by offering a perspective motivated by the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) [Muth, 1961; Sheffrin, 1996] and exploring the process dynamics associated with the actions of decision makers who adjust their expectations about the benefits of a new technology over time in line with bounded rationality. Evans and Honkapohja [2001] define rational expectations as the mathematical conditional expectation of the relevant variables in a decision making or forecasting setting. We will focus on the adoption of technologies that exhibit strong network externalities, and hence, rational expectations will apply to the conditional expectations of decision makers who are interested in technology adoption-related variables. Muth [1961, p. 316] states the REH as follows: "I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory." Begg also comments [1982, p. 30] : "The hypothesis of rational expectations asserts that the unobservable subjective expectations of individuals are exactly the true mathematical conditional expectations implied by the model itself." REH suggests that economic agents form expectations based on the "true" structural model of the economy in which their decisions are made. Their subjective expectations are informed predictions of future events and are the same as the conditional mathematical expectations based on the "true" probability model of outcomes in the economy.
Although REH has since been widely used in other areas of microeconomics and macroeconomics, and notwithstanding the fact that rationality is commonly assumed in business and economic analyses [Zimmerman, 1986] , this article is one of the first attempts to explicitly bring rational expectations economics thinking into the IS field and to use the theory for understanding the complex issues of technology adoption. We will examine three research questions in this article:
□ How do we represent a technology adoption situation where network externalities considerations require potential adopters to adjust their expectations based on what they observe in the market over time?
□ How can we characterize such a situation and model it with a control theory model based on the REH? How can we conceptualize the optimal control in an adoption setting?
□ What are the possible actions that the potential adopters may take, as a result?
Although technology researchers have long analyzed the role of expectations about perceived business value and network externalities in technology adoption, how potential technology adopters reach their observed level of expectations has not been fully understood. So being able to understand the process through which this occurs will help to shed new light on the conditions that enable adoption inertia to either take over or be overcome in the marketplace.
We will first discuss a multi-period model that represents the kind of optimal control decision a potential technology-adopting firm has to make. This involves determining at which point in time the firm should make the decision to adopt in order to maximize the net benefits from the new technology. We then look into a situation where potential adopting firms, prior to making an adoption decision, can freely share information with each other and utilize the information to obtain a better understanding of the value of the new technology and other related issues.
Since the focus is on technologies with strong network externalities, our analysis will be based on an important assumption: that firms prefer to adopt a technology at about the same time in order to be sure that they will obtain a more attractive level of network benefits. To this end, we develop a model in which all potential adopters as well as the technology supplier-as economic agents-perform adaptive learning, and adjust their forecast rules for the accrual of network externalities as new data become available over time. Our analysis of the resulting equilibrium is motivated by the works of Bray and Savin [1986] , Fourgeaud, Gourieroux and Pradel [1986] , and Evans and Honkapohja [2001] , and suggests the kinds of outcomes that may be observed in the marketplace. The optimal control perspective [Sethi and Thompson, 2000] that we develop is intended to deal with the question of how the evaluation of technology benefits and costs are evaluated over the time horizon in which adoption may occur.
Our adaptation of the REH to technology adoption in a control theory model allows us to treat the technology adoption issues using a bounded rationality perspective. Technology adoption decisions are generally complex in nature due to the continuous development of the technology, the competitive interactions of firms, and the path-dependent growth of externality value. As a result, managers need some time before they can really decide what to do with any new technology. Many adoption decision making processes, therefore, can be seen as ongoing processes that involve observations in the marketplace over time, rather than quick decisions.
Consequently, we offer a new approach to improve our understanding of technology adoption.
LITERATURE
A brief summary of the role of expectations in the formation of economic theory and analysis is offered by Evans and Honkapohja [2001] . They maintain that expectations began to play a major role in economics as early as the 1800s, with Henry Thornton's 1802 treatment of paper credit, and Émile Cheysson's 1887 formulation of a framework which had features of the "cobweb model."
1 Hicks [1939] is recognized to have offered the key systematic exposition of the temporary equilibrium approach, in which expectations about future prices influence demand and supply in a general equilibrium context. Muth [1961] formulated the REH.
The REH would not be as popular as it is today without extensive additional work undertaken by macroeconomic theorists. The papers of Lucas [1972 Lucas [ , 1973 Lucas [ , 1975 , Sargent and Wallace [1976] , Lucas and Sargent [1981] and others with new explanations of output and inflation pushed Muth's concept to the vanguard of contemporary economic thinking. This has led to developments in macroeconomic theory and time-series econometric research that have opened up new ways of thinking about the management of modern economies [Pesaran, 1987] . Lucas [1975] interprets the REH as a hypothesis that assumes that every economic agent optimally utilizes available information in forming expectations. Grossman [1981] has argued that the essence of rational expectations is that economic agents have some economic model of the economy which relates the exogenous variables to the endogenous variables which must be forecasted. The REH is based on two assumptions. Economic agents form beliefs based on a given set of information. Their expectations will be conditioned on all available information.
Also, agents will know the stochastic process that generates the equilibrium condition.
The second assumption is what makes the REH unique. However, this assumption often is considered to be too strong. Why? It requires economic agents to have full knowledge of the structure of the relevant models and their parameter values. Considering that decision makers as economic agents have bounded rationality, Sargent [1993] suggests an alternative notion, 1 The basic idea behind the cobweb model is that an agricultural producer who grows a small amount of grain will benefit because high demand will permit him to obtain an attractive price for his crop. The natural response, then, is for the producer to grow more the following year. But every producer will also respond in a similar manner, driving supply up and reducing prices relative to demand, and thus, negatively impacting producers' profits. All producers will subsequently adjust production, but it typically will take a number of periods before a stable equilibrium can be reached.
adaptive learning, in which agents are assumed to be willing and able to update their expectations about relevant parameter values on the basis of newly-received information.
We adopt an assumption consistent with REH adaptive learning: the technology supplier and potential adopters know about the economic structure (e.g., the supply of and demand for) of the technology over time but must learn the parameter values that reflect each potential adopter's willingness-to-pay. Stoneman and Ireland [1983] have shown the importance of supply-side factors in the adoption of technological innovations. The willingness-to-pay of other firms can be estimated by a potential adopter through its communications with other firms in the market.
To support our readers' understanding of the concepts that we are introducing from an area of economic theory that is new in IS research, we include a table of definitions for the primary terms and concepts that are drawn from rational expectations economics theory that we will shortly use to develop our new perspective on IT adoption. (See Appendix 1.)
OPTIMAL CONTROL MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In the optimal control model [Sethi and Thompson, 2000 ] that we develop, we treat the adoption of technologies with strong network externalities from the perspective of REH and adaptive learning. We first discuss the role of first-mover advantage in technology adoption and contrast it with the impacts of network externalities on what is observed to occur in the market.
First-Mover Advantage, Network Externalities and Technology Adoption
There are many different reasons why a firm may choose to adopt a new technology earlier or later. Earlier adoption of emerging technologies gives entrepreneurial firms first-mover advantage based on a strong market reputation, technology leadership, and brand loyalty. Shapiro and Varian [1999] maintain that first-mover advantage can be powerful and long-lasting for firms that can establish an installed base before the competition arrives to make it difficult for later entrants to achieve the scale economies necessary to compete. This implies that first-mover advantage can be short-lived or even fail to materialize if early entrants are unable to maintain their dominant position. First-mover advantage corresponds closely with the risk-taking behavior of decision makers. The common wisdom from the strategy literature suggests that market pioneers will have higher returns if they are successful, but at the same time they bear a higher risk of failure [Shepherd, 1999] . Early technology adopters are more willing to take risks, whereas late adopters are likely to more risk-averse. Decision makers who are more averse to risk, by the same token, will be more likely to make their decisions later, when enough information has become available and they can process it properly. In fact, an important advantage that later adopters have is the ability to learn more about a technology and to observe market acceptance before irrevocably committing limited resources.
The model that we will propose will treat situations where most of the benefits of a new technology come from network effects (e.g., electronic bill payment and presentment, high definition television, etc.). We will investigate a case where some firms (that share similar characteristics or serve similar markets, for example) choose to adopt the new technology at about the same time to avoid the risks of being "stranded." Stranding occurs when only a firm or two adopt the technology and the other firms decide not to, consequently diminishing the expected network benefits. Our model will incorporate an assumption that the network benefits will significantly outweigh other kinds of potential benefits, such as the first-mover advantage.
When potential benefits of a technology mainly come from network externalities, adoption may be delayed because it may take some time before decision makers reach a consensus among themselves about the economic benefits that an emerging IT may bring. This creates interesting dynamics in the adoption decision making process. Firms must now observe each other's actions and take cues from each other before making a decision. In fact, they may share private information about their costs, or even signal to other firms their interest in order to achieve earlier accrual of the network externalities.
An Optimal Control Model for Network Technology Adoption
We begin with an optimal control model in which a firm seeks to maximize the net benefits from adopting a new technology. Since our focus is on an IT with network externalities, the total benefits can be formulated based on a function of stand-alone and non-network value, and network externalities benefits, as a + b(N). In this expression, the term a represents the standalone and non-network benefits that result from the features of the IT artifact that is involved; b(N) denotes the benefit from a network of size N, with the function b representing the strength of network externalities [Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Kauffman, McAndrews and Wang, 2000 ].
In our model, we use the term a t to represent the non-network benefits (which include, among others, the stand-alone benefit and the first-mover advantage) in period t after implementation occurs in period t 0 . We denote the fixed implementation cost as f t0 , and the recurring cost in each period t following implementation as c t . We also consider the time interval [t 0 , T] over which an adopting firm optimizes value, with T representing the lifespan of the technology. Finally, we suppress the notation for the time value of money, and assume that there is a one-period lag before the firm starts realizing the benefits. The resulting objective function for each firm is to maximize the net benefit:
Maximize [ for each t from t
The variables are defined as follows: The model suggests that each firm will dynamically compute the sum of the net benefits for each potential adoption period. Starting from period t = 0, each firm will perform the computation for time t 0 = 0, t 0 = 1, …, t 0 = T -1 and determine which period will bring the maximum sum of net benefits. Therefore, in period t 0 = 0, a firm will compute the following:
:
It will also determine the maximum profit opportunity among π 0 , π 1 , …, π T-1 . If the maximum is π 0 , then the firm will adopt the technology at t 0 = 0. Otherwise, it will wait until the next period, t 0 = 1, and compute the following:
The firm will then determine the maximum of π 1 , π 2 , …, π T as before. Similarly, if the maximum is π 1 , then the firm will adopt the technology at t 0 = 1. Otherwise, it will wait until the next period t 0 = 2 and recalculate the sum of net benefits for each period starting with t 0 = 2, determine the maximum, and see if the maximum is π 2 . If not, the process will be repeated until the maximum coincides with the current period, signifying the optimal adoption period, t 0 *.
The need for recalculation each period is due to the expected number of adopters, as well as their individual expectations about the benefit and cost components, may be updated over time based on new information they receive. New information may result from a firm's effort in monitoring the environment or it may come from another firm motivated to persuade others to adopt the technology to realize the network benefits. This is known as signaling [Spence, 1973] .
A firm should adopt the technology only if the total benefits minus the recurring costs during the period [t 0+1 , T] exceed the implementation cost, f t0 , i.e., [ . Furthermore, to maximize the net benefits in the optimal control problem, the firm should adopt and implement the technology as soon as the total benefits a will increase the sum of the net benefits, but an adoption and implementation that is done too early before the net benefit becomes positive will only reduce the sum of the net benefits.
New technologies show increasing benefits and decreasing costs over time. They are enhanced and include more features as they become cheaper due to competition and efficiency.
When a technology exhibits network externalities, most of the benefit increases will come from the growth of adopters over time. As soon as the expected number of adopters reaches a certain level that generates a large enough network benefit that, together with the stand-alone benefit, will offset the recurring cost, a firm should implement the technology to maximize net benefit.
Signaling and Information Processing
Signaling occurs when firms are still in the midst of their adoption decision making processes. Due to the desire to realize the network benefits, a firm that would like to see a new technology adopted will signal a favorable opinion of the technology to the other firms. A firm may make a positive signal because it has experience dealing with similar technologies, has better forecasting infrastructure and skills, or has a more upbeat managerial outlook.
Signaling may or may not incur costs depending on how the signals are sent by the firm.
When a firm can transmit information freely through a process known as cheap talk, regardless of how other firms accept and process the information, the signaling costs will be insignificant.
When there are significant costs involved-an extreme case is signaling via a pilot implementation of the technology under consideration-a firm will be more selective in transmitting any information and may wait until it is certain that other firms are ready to process the information it transmits. This readiness is measured by a firm's information processing cost.
The higher the information processing cost, the less ready the firm to process the information it receives.
Our general optimal control model can be rewritten to include various types of signaling, from costless to costly signaling. A firm that is willing to signal will incur some cost if it can reasonably expect that the effort will accelerate the adoption rate, allowing the firm and other firms to enjoy a higher sum of net benefits during the life cycle of the technology. The signaling cost creates real options since it allows the firm to make an investment and then decide whether to invest fully in the technology based on the resulting signals.
A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION
As we have seen in the optimal control model, a necessary condition for adoption and implementation would be that the total net benefits over the period exceed the implementation cost. We now place this model in the rational expectations context with costless signaling.
Modeling Preliminaries
Our rational expectations model consists of a group of N potential technology-adopting firms and one technology supplier firm. The size of the group N is the minimum number of adopters that will trigger the adoption and implementation. Although we assume there is only one supplier, other suppliers will come into play with newer and better technologies. Considering that the markets for new and emerging ITs are generally contestable and have low barriers to entry [Baumol, Panzer and Willig, 1982] , the supplier in our model cannot exercise monopoly power since the potential adopting firms will have choices with the arrivals of future suppliers of a similar technology. Moreover, as we have stated earlier, the technology that we consider exhibits strong network externalities characteristics, yielding higher value to adopters as their number increases.
Our main conjecture is that all N potential adopters will make the adoption decision at about the same time: when they learn that all adopters in their group are ready to adopt. This group may consist of firms that share similar characteristics or serve similar markets, signifying the actual potential for realizing the network benefits. For example, in the new technology arena of electronic bill presentment and payment (EBPP), a group may include financial services, telecommunications, insurance and utilities firms that serve the same geographical market.
These firms can expect network externalities benefits to be created when they adopt the technology together since consumers will be more likely to adopt the EBPP service as the number of firms (i.e., billers) offering the service increases Kauffman, 2001 and 2003 ].
Willingness-to-Pay, Bounded Rationality, and Rational Expectations Adoption
A learning process is necessary since it will take some time before each of the firms reaches a "comfort level" to make a decision due to the fact that they may initially have different value expectations about the technology, reflecting different levels of willingness-to-pay. This might be because they can convert IT investments into value more quickly than other firms, or because they experience different levels of implementation costs or recurring maintenance and enhancement costs for the technologies and systems they adopt. When signaling is free, any firm can transmit information freely, regardless of other firms are going to process the information.
In our rational expectations model, the decision rule for each firm in every period (i.e., either to adopt or not adopt the technology) is based on the expected value of the network of adopting firms, adjusted for fixed implementation and variable recurring costs for maintenance and enhancement, as described previously in the optimal control model. We operationalize this for the rational expectations analysis in terms of the price expectation of each of the potential adopting firms relative to the new technology. The price expectation captures information about the business value of the new technology, in the context of market supply and demand. If all firm's price expectations (and hence, their willingness-to-pay) are at least equal to the vendors' selling prices of the technology, then, according to our modeling interpretation, every firm will decide to adopt the technology in the period; otherwise, none of the firms will adopt. Based on the concepts of REH and adaptive learning-and due to bounded rationality-firms may start out with different price expectations and different levels of willingness to pay, some of which may be below the selling price set by the technology supplier.
For example, some (and possibly all) of the price expectations may be lower than the selling price set by the technology supplier. In every period, each firm will adjust its willingness-to-pay to reflect changes that may have occurred during the past period. In addition, the technology supplier may also adjust its selling price in each period to reflect its own reading of market demand. As the constraint in the optimal control model suggests, the adoption of the technology will take place only when all potential adopters' willingness-to-pay levels are at least equal to the selling price of the technology. As we will shortly show, this will occur in a process that reaches the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) point [Fryman, 1982] . There, all acts of learning are complete, in the sense that there is no more incentive on the part of economic agents to change the beliefs they hold about their economic environment.
The Rational Expectations Model Analysis Process
In our modeling analysis, we first will look at how the technology supplier reaches the REE.
We will then discuss how the heterogeneous willingness-to-pay levels-stated as price expectations for the new technology-of N potential technology-adopting firms converge to the REE. Once the relevant constraint in the optimal control model is satisfied, all firms should adopt, though they have the option to wait longer to see if their price expectations are correct. This is based on the idea that firms have unique levels of willingness-to-pay, the assessments of which may be perceived in the market as being "accurate-within-an-error." The error results from the information processing limitations that most firms have. As a result, they typically will know that they may not know enough to make the best estimate, which is common with decision problems involving infinite regress [Kelly, 2000; Melberg, 1999] .
All N potential adopting firms share the same interest: each would like to see the others adopt to maximize the benefits of the technology. This guides the behaviors of the decision makers of the firms to encourage the free flow of information. Although willingness-to-pay cannot be observed directly, potential adopters will be able to utilize as a proxy some of the observable economic indicators at the firm, industry, and macro level. In addition, we assume that each firm is willing to share its assessment of the new technology with other firms, directly through interfirm exchanges and indirectly through market signaling. We further assume that the signaling is costless. However, since each firm may have different information processing capabilities, it will take some time before their expectations converge to reach an equilibrium.
THE TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER'S RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL
We consider a multi-period scenario in which the new technology supplier predicts the price at which all potential adopters are willing to pay for the technology. Similar to the role of price expectations relative to willingness-to-pay on the adopter side, the price the supplier establishes also can represent the technology supplier's assessment of what adopters are willing to pay.
Modeling Assumptions
We will use a market-clearing condition for supply and demand to show that, under certain conditions, the technology supplier will be able to eventually arrive at the correct prediction of the price that represents the willingness-to-pay of all the potential adopters. We also will model how potential adopters arrive at the same price expectations under learning, despite their initially heterogeneous levels of willingness-to-pay.
The technology supplier must predict the willingness-to-pay of the potential adopters of its technology in every period to plan for the resources (e.g., people, equipment) needed to serve the market in period t. The supply of the technology will depend on the supplier's expectation of the market's average willingness-to-pay. In the period when adoption occurs, this price is the actual price that each of the adopters will pay for the technology.
We further assume that all potential adopters-as well as the technology supplier-will be able to assess others' willingness-to-pay. If each of the potential adopters (through whatever means are available to them in the marketplace) were able to reveal its willingness-to-pay and adjust its valuation, all will reach a consensus to purchase the technology at the average price.
Although we assume free flow of information, in the early periods adoption still may not occur.
Why? Because each potential adopter's bounded rationality prevents it from immediately adjusting its willingness-to-pay. Firms adjust their expectations based on new available information, which includes price expectations of other firms and other observable variables.
These willingness-to-pay levels only become known to each of the agents at the end of period, when more information will become available causing each potential adopter to adjust its own willingness-to-pay. This process will repeat itself until an equilibrium is reached, and the willingness-to-pay levels across firms in the market converge. Our assumption that each potential adopter attempts to learn the others' willingness to pay is supported by the extensive contacts that occur among firms whose senior managers, strategic planners and IT professionals sample the market's attitude relative to the adoption of a technological innovation.
Pseudo-Prices, Willingness-to-Pay, Demand and Supply
We let be the pseudo-price in period t. The word pseudo-price is intended to highlight the contrast between demand based on the actual price that potential adopters will pay if each eventually decides to purchase the technology, as opposed to the expected demand that is revealed prior to actual adoption. Thus the pseudo-price for a period indicates the price that would prevail if adoptions occurred in that period. Recall that one of our main assumptions is that information flows freely due to the interests that potential adopting firms share. This creates the willingness for firms to send signals to each other either directly or indirectly, enabling each to know the others' willingness-to-pay for the new technology and, thus, the pseudo-price in p t p every period prior to the adoption. However, this pseudo-price will change from period to period, as firms adjust their willingness-to-pay based on newly-available information.
(Appendix 1 provides details for the modeling notation used in the remainder of the paper.)
We represent the technology demand and supply functions in period t with d t and s t , and
analyze the implications of demand-supply equilibrium in a manner similar to Evans and Honkapohja [2001] . Technology demand in period t is given by: Just like the potential adopters, the supplier will be able to observe the pseudo-price in period t -1. The supplier can use this to estimate the supply price, , which also is an estimate of the adopters' willingness-to-pay. The expected price that the supplier estimates in period Here is a vector of observable exogenous variables in period t -1 that affect the level of supply. is the intercept of the supply function, is a vector of parameters for the variables that affect supply, and represents the unobservable drivers of the new technology supply. The parameter σ indicates that the supply for the new technology is increasing in price.
Another interpretation of the pseudo-price discussed above is the market equilibrium price of the new technology under consideration for adoption. In equilibrium, each potential adopter is willing to pay this price, and the supplier is willing to sell the technology at the same price. The equilibrium price itself is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves, In these expressions, the parameter w is the proportional difference between the intercept of the demand and supply curves. The greater the proportional difference, w, the higher the market clearing price and quantity. The parameter v is the ratio of the slope of the supply curve to that of the demand curve. Any plausible economic demand and supply situation will have an absolute value, |v| < 1. The parameter u represents the magnitude to which the exogenous variables will negatively affect the price. The parameter, ε t , incorporates and , the unobservable drivers of demand and supply that result in the market-clearing price. We next show that the technology supplier learns the potential adopters' expectations and adjust its own expectation to reach a condition that allows the adoption of its new technology.
Recall that is the supplier's expected price determined in period t -1. The REH maintains that the expected value of is the optimal prediction made in period t -1: the best linear predictor which minimizes the expected prediction's squared error. This assessment is based on a set of 
This gives a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) because does not depend on the expectation of future prices for the new technology. As pointed out previously, a REE refers to a state in the marketplace where all acts of learning are complete; so there is no more incentive on the part of agents to change the beliefs they hold about their economic environment. Pesaran [1987, p. 33] maintains that a REE can be characterized by three main features: all markets clear at equilibrium prices; every agent knows the relationship between equilibrium prices and private information of all other agents; and, the information contained in equilibrium prices is fully exploited by all agents in making inferences about the private information of others.
We now introduce adaptive learning into the process that occurs as buyers form their willingness-to-pay levels for adoption of the new technology. When learning is possible, the supplier's prediction of price, p t s , is not optimal; however, it is expected to improve over time.
The supplier believes that p t s follows the process described in Equation 9 and corresponding to the REE, but must estimate y and z. This signifies that in forecasting the price, the technology supplier acts like an econometrician or a forecaster: [Evans and Honkapohja, 2001] , suggesting that the firm attempts to estimate the parameters y and z. PLM is the stochastic process generating the equilibrium condition that economic agents believe in. This is the key bounded rationality assumption. In forecasting the price, the decision makers in the firm act in aggregate like an econometrician who believes that the economy has reached equilibrium.
They use all available data to estimate the parameters of Equation 10. We further assume that the technology supplier estimates y and z using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of on , ( i ). This is called least squares learning. As a result, in period , the forecast is made using the following least squares regression equation:
Convergence and Expectational Stability
Next we will see that the parameters y and z indeed converge to certain values over time and that the convergence is stable, indicating that the supplier's price estimate (or expected price)
will eventually match the potential adopters' average willingness-to-pay. Recall that this is one of the important assumptions that we made for technology adoption to occur in the first place: all potential adopters must eventually arrive at the same willingness-to-pay and the technology supplier must be willing to sell its technology at the price that all the potential adopters are willing to pay. Bray and Savin [1986] have shown that the convergence of least squares learning will be obtained if and only if v < 1. To show that the convergence that characterizes the rational expectations equilibrium is stable, it is necessary to use the expectational stability principle of Evans and Honkapohja [2001] .
DEFINITION (THE EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY PRINCIPAL).
A rational expectations equilibrium is said to be e-stable if, given a small deviation of expectations functions from rationality, the system returns to the equilibrium under a natural updating rule.
Imposing e-stability can narrow the number of acceptable solutions, and in some but not all cases, there will a unique locally stable equilibrium [Evans, 1985] .
Thus, under least squares learning, the technology supplier in our model will be able to learn the potential adopters' expectations and adjust its expectations so convergence results between its price for the new technology and the adopters' willingness-to-pay so adoption occurs. The managerial implication is clear. To be successful, a technology supplier that enters the market with a new technology that shows the appropriate network externalities characteristics should try to learn about willingness-to-pay in the market and keep adjusting its prices based on signals from the potential adopters and other relevant indicators. The model also reveals that, through information sharing, it is possible for the technology supplier to eventually cause technology adoption to occur despite the initial differences in expectations among potential adopters.
THE HETEROGENEOUS ADOPTERS' RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL
We will now show how heterogeneous adopters may eventually reach the same willingnessto-pay, despite their initially different expectations. Since there are N potential adopters, there can initially be as many as N different levels of willingness-to-pay or price expectations. Muth [1961] suggested that the price expectations of firms tend to be distributed even for the same information set. As a result, we presume that a distribution of willingness-to-pay levels will be observed. The distribution will change over time as each firm adjusts its expectations based on newly-revealed information in each period. Such stochastic changes are captured by the dynamic system in our model. These different expectations also are due to bounded rationality: each firm may have a different ability to access and process information. However, all firms learn asymptotically over time to reach the REE.
Analysis of the Heterogeneous Potential Adopters Model
At the beginning of the period t, each potential adopting firm i holds its own price expectation, p i , which is formed based on the set of available information conditional on each firm's bounded rationality. The price reflects the potential adopter's willingness-to-pay for the technology, as before. Now since the information available to each potential adopter may vary, the prices that they hold can be different from each other. We assume that each potential technology adopter is able to forecast according to a linear rule:
Each potential adopter arrives at different parameter estimates, however. As with the technology supplier, all potential technology adopters also learn from past prices, as the past perceptions of the market's willingness-to-pay (represented by ), and the observable variables . 
The system is recursive and the above set of equations is a globally stable system. Its stability is determined by the stability of the change in z i with respect to a small period of time τ:
The coefficient matrix of this linear system has N -1 eigenvalues of -1 and one eigenvalue of v -1. Therefore, it is globally asymptotically stable with each z i converging to z , provided v < 1. The condition occurs when the demand curve crosses the supply curve from above. This indicates that if the potential adopters and the technology supplier both act normally in the economic sense (i.e., demand increases when price decreases and vice versa, and by the same token, supply increases when price increases and vice versa), then the rational expectations will reach an equilibrium that is stable under learning. When the supply curve crosses the demand curve from above, an economically implausible case occurs. This causes the rational expectations equilibrium to be unstable under learning. When
the supply curve is parallel to the demand curve, so no rational expectations equilibrium will exist.
MANAGERIAL DISCUSSION
Our optimal control model suggests that a firm should adopt and implement a new technology that is subject to network externalities as soon as the discounted total benefits offset the recurring cost. For a technology with strong network externalities, the majority of the benefits will come from the network effects. This means that a firm should look closely at the other potential adopting firms and observe their behaviors. Indeed, this proves to be the main challenge for each firm in our model. The ability of all of the potential adopters in the model to eventually reach a consensus in the estimation of the willingness-to-pay is the primary condition that must be satisfied. As we have seen, the consensus willingness-to-pay is also what the technology supplier continues to observe and use as a basis for adjusting its price for the new technology. We have shown that it is possible for all the potential adopters to reach a consensus, allowing technology adoption to occur. The main assumption of the REH is that economic agents know the true equilibrium relations of the economy [Pesaran, 1987] . The equilibrium is the future state of the economy in which the new technology under consideration reaches its maturity, i.e., when the benefits of the new technology are confirmed and accepted by the market. With adaptive learning, agents can learn over time the actual values of the parameters in the equilibrium relations, and the assumption that the agents know the true equilibrium also will hold.
The model we use indicates that as long as the potential adopters and the technology supplier act rationally in the usual economic sense (e.g., with value maximum in mind, and logically, based on bounded rationality), the equilibrium will be reached and it will be stable under learning. There are cases, however, where a potential adopter may not act as others expect. For example, a firm may ignore fixed implementation and variable costs, and adopt a new technology based on strategic considerations, an opportunity to preempt other firms, or a desire to be a market leader with technological innovation. Another example is when a large firm can afford to adopt a new technology based on its size and market share, setting the standards for its industry. Rational expectations may not apply in such cases in the way we have described.
For any new and emerging technology, there is a phase of over-enthusiasm and unrealistic projections due to a flurry of well-publicized activity by technology vendors, resulting in some successes, but more failures, as the technology is pushed to its limits. During this phase, which Gartner Research has called the "peak of inflated expectations" [Linden, Fenn and Haley, 2001 ], it is possible that self-fulfilling expectations will be developed when market participants fail to understand the true economy relationship. This occurs when everyone acts as if "the model" is correct, and knows that every other firm believes in the same model and acts the same way. It is also possible that only a subset of the market participants maintains a belief in the "false model."
In either case, our results suggest that the adoption of a new technology based on expectations about network externalities benefits could occur prematurely, depending on how fast the potential adopters reach a consensus in terms of their willingness-to-pay.
This is because our model allows the set of potential adopting firms that benchmark against each other to be of any size. So it is possible to have a small set of firms with similar characteristics (e.g., firms in the same industry, firms serving the same geographical location and/or market segment, etc.) that share similar interests and beliefs in the potential of the technology. Each of these firms in the set will observe the behaviors and actions of the other firms within the same set and base their adoption decisions on such observations. Firms then will tend to act rationally, and make economically plausible adoption decisions. However, if the firms use the same evaluation model, then convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium can occur in a relatively short amount of time because of the small set, resulting in adoption.
The model that we have proposed based on REH and adaptive learning is different from what happens under the rational herding behavior theory of Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [1992, 1998 ]. This theory suggests, as ours does, that everyone will do what everyone else is observed to be doing-only with different treatment of privately-held information. With herding, if one firm decides to adopt the new technology, then the second firm will follow suit and adopt the same technology, ignoring its own information. Other firms will do the same, joining the herd. Banerjee [1992] argues that the decision of the second firm to ignore its own information and join the herd imposes a negative externality on the rest of the group. If the second firm had used its own information, then its decision would have encouraged the rest of the firms to use their own information as well, leading to a rational expectations equilibrium.
The key difference between the REH and herd behavior theories lies in the amount of information that is used. Although herding theory involves individual rationality, there is no meaningful information sharing among the decision makers prior to adoption [Li, forthcoming] .
Herding behavior defies a very basic assumption of economic behavior: that decision makers as economic agents do the best they can with whatever information they have [Au and Kauffman, 2003 ]. Rational expectations and adaptive learning, in contrast, assume that decision makers will utilize all available information efficiently and will be able to learn the true value of a prospective technology adoption investment over time.
The firms whose behavior we modeled are likely to be a fraction of the total number of potential adopting firms. The REE convergence that leads to the adoption of a new technology among a group of firms may trigger adoption decisions for the same technology by the rest of the firms in the market. This is because the network externalities characteristics may tip the market to favor the technology. Why? Because the market may see the adoption by a few firmsespecially if the firms are considered to be the most informed-as a positive signal that reinforces the private signals that each of the firms sends and receives in the market. This is called an informational cascade, and has been described by economists Welch, 1992 and Zhang, 1997] and IS researchers [Li, forthcoming] .
This suggests that the ability of a technology supplier to quickly convince as many potential adopters as possible of the potential of the technology is critical to the new technology's adoption success in the market. If the technology vendor is able to persuade potential adopters to use an evaluation model which favors adoption, this may be all it takes to plant the seeds for the growth of network externalities. It may not even be necessary to wait until the technology has actually proven itself by demonstrating that it can deliver the promised real world benefits.
CONCLUSION
We offer a relatively new theoretical approach to analyze the adoption of ITs that exhibit network externalities characteristics. We have used optimal control theory thinking to introduce the general adoption decision-making model that involves multiple periods, and the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) and related theory to explain why firms with heterogeneous expectations about the potential value of a new technology are eventually able to arrive at contemporaneous decisions to adopt the same technology, creating the desired network externalities. We have described how different levels of willingness-to-pay of the potential technology adopters may eventually converge. We have also shown that, if the technology supplier in our model keeps observing the signals and perceptions that the market (i.e., the potential adopters) provides and adjusts its expected price accordingly, it will eventually arrive at the same price expectations (at the rational expectations equilibrium) as the technology adopters.
This ability to reach the same price expectation level, we have argued, is essential for obtaining network externalities through simultaneous or time-clustered adoption. In addition, we have argued that a technology supplier can capitalize on the network externalities characteristics of its technology and draw in many adopters by making them believe in a certain model that favors the new technology.
Our model reflects both bounded rationality and adaptive learning. This is necessary to treat some of the real issues that arise in new technology adoption. For example, potential technology adopters need to learn relevant information about the newly-introduced technology and other developments related to it (e.g., the status of competing technologies, alternative vendor commitment levels, etc.). Moreover, the technology supplier must continuously adjust its pricing based on the feedback that it gathers from its marketplace of potential adopters. We have assumed that, in the learning phase, the potential adopters and the technology supplier are able to know the equilibrium adoption model, but may be ignorant of its parameter values. This is due to bounded rationality, but that will be overcome as adaptive learning occurs.
Our model incorporates commonly used OLS regression expressions. Although they clearly are a simplification of how the real world works, we nevertheless believe that they are representative of the new technology adoption settings that involve the kind of learning that we have discussed. The setup can be interpreted as a linear regression model with time-varying parameters, for instance. Other possible functions-such as univariate/multivariate or linear/non-linear, among others-can also be considered for other learning situations. However, the estimates may or may not converge, or they may result in multiple rational expectations equilibria. These have been characterized in the rational expectations macroeconomics literature that we have read using various terms, such as coordination failures, sunspots, bubbles, endogenous fluctuations, and indeterminacy of equilibria. The potential existence of multiple equilibria adds to the complexity of a model that actually may suggest non-adoption of the new technology. The arrival in the market of a new competing technology typically will make the choices that firms must choose among clearer, and may result in a new adoption equilibrium [Au and Kauffman, 2001] . In the particular case of OLS regression that we have used in our model, we are able to show that all the potential adopters and the technology supplier will eventually reach an equilibrium that is stable under learning as long as they act normally in the economic sense: all their actions should be in synch with the economic laws of supply and demand.
Muth [1961] maintains that from a purely theoretical perspective, there are good reasons for assuming rationality. One of them is because it is a principle that is applicable to all dynamic problems. However, the only real test of this assertion is to examine the empirical implications of the rational expectations hypothesis in practical situations. Thus, our efforts here should be seen as the first step toward applying rational expectation economics thinking to further understand new technology adoption issues when network externalities are present. Going forward, it will be critical to understand the economic variables that potential technology adopters observe during their learning process. This will enable us to predict the kinds of outcomes when other new technologies with similar characteristics are introduced to the market.
